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Mazur: The Beginning of the End for Women in the Military

SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE: SOME THOUGHTS ON GAY SEX
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Joseph S. Jackson*

"What [protects us from oppressive laws] ... is the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority
to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they
impose on you and me."'
A careless reading of Bowers v. Hardwick' might lead one to claim
that criminalizing gay sex is unassailably constitutional. Dissenting in
Romer v. Evans,3 Justice Scalia makes this claim, and uses it to mount
a defense of Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibited the state from
enacting laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination.'
However, Bowers held only that criminalizing homosexual sodomy did
not violate the Due Process Clause.' The Court expressly noted that
other constitutional objections to the statute, including those based on
the Equal Protection Clause, were not at issue." Thus, Romer's "holding
* Fellow, Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy, University of Virginia School
of Law. A.B. 1979, Princeton University; J.D. 1982, University of Florida College of Law. I
wish to thank Thomas E. Cotter, Diane H. Mazur, Sharon E. Rush, and especially Elizabeth
McCulloch for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine.
1. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
4. See id. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). I discuss the flaws in Justice Scalia's
defense of Amendment 2 in Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and
the PoliticsofEqual Protection,45 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1997). Thought-provoking
analyses of Romer include Akhil R. Amar, Attainder andAmendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REv. 203 (1996); Louis M. Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival
of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. Cr. REv. 67 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53-71 (1996).
5. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
6. Id. at 196 n.8. As Akhil Amar has noted, the Court's refusal in Bowers to address the
equal protection issue makes its judgment upholding the Georgia statute "highly dubious":
Either male-female anal sex can be criminalized or it cannot. If it can, how
exactly are the principles of Eisenstadt [v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)] and
now [Planned Parenthood v.] Casey [505 U.S. 833 (1992)] to be distinguished
away? If it cannot, then doesn't criminalization of male-male-but not male-
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that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment"
does not contradict Bowers, as Justice Scalia asserts! Indeed, the
"singling out" of homosexual conduct is precisely what Bowers did not
address.'
Whether the government may constitutionally single out homosexual
conduct for disfavorable treatment is an important question. The antisodomy laws of seven states explicitly apply only to homosexual
conduct and the anti-sodomy laws of others have been construed not to
apply to heterosexual acts.9 In addition, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy excluding gays and lesbians from the military 0 constitutes
precisely this kind of discriminatory treatment. If discrimination against
homosexual conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause, gays and
lesbians can vindicate their right to serve in the armed forces without
resorting to the unfortunate "status/conduct" distinction that has plagued
litigation concerning that exclusionary policy and its predecessors."
Laws singling out homosexual conduct for disfavorable treatment
may take one of two forms. The anti-sodomy statute considered in
Bowers was facially neutral-it barred "any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the month or anus of another."' 2 However,
the statute was selectively enforced against persons of the same sex:
plaintiffs "John and Mary Doe" could not show a sufficient threat of
prosecution under the statute to establish standing, 3 and Georgia
sought to defend the statute only as applied to homosexual acts. 4 By
contrast, the military's exclusion of gays and lesbians explicitly
incorporates a sex-based classification as part of the statutory definition
of the proscribed conduct: " 'homosexual act' means.., any bodily

female-sodomy constitute de jure sex discrimination, in the same way
antimiscegenation laws constituted de jure race discrimination?
Amar, supra note 4, at 231-32 (footnotes omitted).
7. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. For a cogent explanation of the fundamentally different analyses required under the
due process and equal protection clauses, which comments specifically on the inapplicability of
Bowers to equal protection claims of gays and lesbians, see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection,
55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 (1988).
9. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
38-39 & nn.d-f (1997).
10. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1997); see also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
11. See generally Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays in the
Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 223, 232-49 (1996).
12. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
13. Id. at 188 n.2.
dissenting).
14. Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 218 n.10 (Stevens, J.,
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contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of
the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.... .""
For equal protection purposes, it makes no difference whether the
discriminatory result is achieved through an explicit classification or
through the selective enforcement of a facially-neutral statute: "Though
the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it
is applied and administered by public authority with... an unequal
hand,... the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution."' 6 Thus, the policy of selective enforcement effectively
amends the Georgia statute; we must read it as though it proscribed
contact between the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person of the same sex.
As these examples make clear, laws burdening or prohibiting
homosexual sexual conduct tacitly or explicitly make use of a classification based on sex. Conduct is either proscribed or permitted depending
on the sex of the person engaged in the conduct; the underlying conduct
itself is the same: "The man who is engaged in cunnilingus is doing
exactly the same things with exactly the same part of his body, and
doing them to the same body parts of the woman, as the lesbian [who
engages in cunnilingus]. The genitalia of the person performing an act
of oral sex are simply not involved in that act.... ""
In short, there is no such thing as "homosexual sex." 8 Rather, there
are various forms of sexual conduct, which may be engaged in by men
and by women. To speak of a societal interest in discouraging homosexual conduct, as the Court did in Bowers and as Justice Scalia did in
Romer, is to mask the root of the equal protection problem in the same
way the concept of miscegenation masked the equal protection problem
in Pace v. Alabama 9 by enabling the Court to treat interracial sex as
a distinct offense from "garden variety" fornication." In fact, however,
15. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(f)(3)(A) (1997) (emphasis added). Such acts constitute grounds for
separation from military service. Id. § 654(b)(1).
16. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
17. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 157 (1996).
18. See id. ('The seeming puzzle of whether the man who has sex with a man is engaging
in 'the same conduct' as the woman who has sex with a man is an artifact of the reification of
a category: 'homosexual sex.' "). But see Seidman, supra note 4, at 119 (suggesting that viable
distinctions might be drawn between gay sex and heterosexual sex).
19. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
20. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188-89 (1964) ('The opinion [in Pace]
acknowledged that... [equal protection] implies that any person, 'whatever his race *** shall
not be subjected, for the same offense, to any greater or different punishment.' . . . But taking
quite literally its own words, 'for the same offense' (emphasis supplied), the Court pointed out
that Alabama had designated as a separate offense the commission by a white person and a
Negro of the identical acts forbidden by the general [anti-fornication] provisions."). Andrew
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fornication is fornication regardless of the racial identity of the
participants, and to enact a statute that makes the imposition of
sanctions dependant on the racial identity of the actors is impermissible.
"[I]t is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our
Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race
of the actor. Discrimination of that kind is invidious per se. '
One of the reasons the Constitution does not tolerate such classifications is that they enforce racial hierarchy and stigmatize non-whites as
less than equal. For example, Loving v. Virginia22 nullified Virginia's
anti-miscegenation statute as an impermissible attempt "to maintain
White Supremacy.' 23 Kenneth Karst has pointed out how laws burdening gays and lesbians similarly enforce a social hierarchy, in this case
the dominance of heterosexuals over gays and lesbians.24 Andrew
Koppelman has argued that these laws also enforce male domination
over women.2" On either ground, such laws implicate the principle of
equal citizenship, which "presumptively insists that every individual is
entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected and
responsible participant" and "forbids the organized society to stigmatize
an individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste."26
Moreover, as discussed above, to the extent these laws classify on the
basis of homosexual conduct, they tacitly or explicitly utilize a sexbased classification and, under standard equal protection doctrine, can
be sustained only by " 'an exceedingly persuasive justification.' "'27
But there is another aspect to these kinds of laws, another way to
think about the constitutional problem they pose, that ties in to the core
principle of equality before the law. That principle insists that who you
are does not affect the legal rules you must obey; all persons are subject

Koppelman has developed this argument at length. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 154-58;
see also Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 150-51 (1988); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination
Against Lesbian and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208-12 (1994).
21. Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
22. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. Id. at 11.
24. See KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER
IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 31-37, 57-66, 124-37 (1993).
25. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 17, at 153-75.
26. KARST, supra note 24, at x. For elaboration and defense of this view, see KENNETH
L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 43-56 (1989)
[hereinafter KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA]; Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:Equal Citizenship
Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-17 (1977).
27. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982)).
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to the same laws. In a certain limited sense, anti-miscegenation statutes
satisfy this requirement because all are bound by the prohibition against
marrying outside one's race, but in a different sense, such laws create
one rule for whites, and another for non-whites. The latter, but not the
former, may be punished for marrying a white person. Seen in this light,
anti-miscegenation statutes violate the principle of equality before the
law; they impose different rules for different people.28
The Equal Protection Clause serves to protect us from laws that are
substantively oppressive by "requir[ing] the democratic majority to
accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and
me."29 This protective function is lost when the democratic majority is
free to define offenses in a way that "makes the criminality of an act
depend upon the race of the actor."'3 It is similarly lost when sexual
acts are proscribed or permitted depending on whether they are
performed by homosexuals or heterosexuals. Indeed, the military's
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy shows just how oppressive non-universal
laws may be: one can hardly conceive that a voluntary army could be
maintained in the face of an even-handed ban on "any bodily contact,
actively undertaken or passively permitted... for the purpose of
satisfying sexual desires."'" In short, "homosexual sex," like "interracial sex," incorporates a restriction on who is engaging in the conduct
into the very definition of the conduct itself, so that a law proscribing
such conduct, while appearing to be universally applicable, in fact
imposes different rules for different people.
Suppose a state, in order to reduce traffic congestion, enacted a law
revoking the driver's licenses of gays and lesbians, or of women, or of
persons whose last name begins with K. Though such a law would
further the legitimate objective of reducing traffic congestion, it clearly
would violate the Equal Protection Clause: no legitimate justification
could plausibly explain the decision to make this class of people, but not

28. It might be objected that any law which classifies on the basis of a trait imposes
different rules for different people in this sense. For example, laws barring those over the age
of 50 from employment as police officers, or barring the blind from driving cars, do so. What
distinguishes these types of classifications, which do not appear to undermine the safeguards the
Equal Protection Clause provides against oppressive laws, is that a given age and physical
disability are characteristics that "the democratic majority" and its "loved ones" may one day
share. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
29. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(f)(3)(A) (1997); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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others, bear the burden of meeting this objective.32 The law would be
unconstitutionally underinclusive.
Laws criminalizing or otherwise burdening same-sex sexual acts but
not different-sex sexual acts presumptively suffer from the same
constitutional problem. If the goal of such legislation is to "preserve
traditional sexual mores"33 the legislation appears just as underinclusive
as the driver's license revocation laws posited above because those
mores proscribe different-sex as well as same-sex sodomy. 4 The same
sort of underinclusiveness belies the high-minded claims of those who
seek to discriminate against gays and lesbians in housing and employment on religious or moral grounds. Unless these people would also
refuse to rent their property to or employ heterosexuals who engage in
oral or anal (or indeed, any non-marital) sex, their claim of high moral
ground is sheer hypocrisy, prejudice masquerading as principle.35
The reason these laws raise the concern that the democratic majority
has imposed on others burdens they would not tolerate "for themselves
and their loved ones"36 is that, like race and sex, sexual orientation is
a fixed characteristic: "[w]e are not all equally likely to wake up
tomorrow and feel gay."37 By contrast, the democratic majority know
that they, or their descendants, may one day have to bear the burdens
they impose on the basis of age or physical disability.
It might be objected that this argument proves too much and calls
into question laws barring incest and sex with children. After all, these
laws also criminalize sex on the basis of the identity of the participants.
32. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (noting that legislative classifications,
even under the standard of "rationality... must find some footing in the realities of the subject
addressed by the legislation"); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140 (1972) ("[Tihe Equal
Protection Clause 'imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled
out.' ") (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966)).
33. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
34. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215 & nn.4 & 5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the
"condemnation [of sodomy is] equally damning for heterosexual and homosexual sodomy").
35. Compare, e.g., Leviticus 18:22, 20:13 (homosexual conduct) with Leviticus 18:20,
20:10 (adultery); see also Exodus 20:14 (adultery); Deuteronomy 5:18, 22:22 (same); Matthew
19:18 (same); Mark 10:19 (same); Luke 18:20 (same); Romans 13:9 (same); I Corinthians6:910, 13, 15-18 (fornication); I Thessalonians4:3 (same); Deuteronomy 22:25 (rape).
36. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring).
37. Amar, supra note 4, at 233. But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a
Bill ofAttainder?Some QuestionsAbout ProfessorAmar's Analysis ofRomer, 95 MICH. L. REV.
236, 244-46 (1996) (questioning the fixed nature of sexual orientation).
38. Classifications based on mental illness or developmental disabilities present a more
difficult question. To the extent legislators believe anyone might possess these characteristics,
the characteristics are more like age and less like race or sex. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (discussing a "veil of ignorance" as to individual
characteristics under which fair laws might be enacted).
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But age-based classifications that bar sex with children are universal in
a way that race- and sex-based classifications are not.39 Moreover,
because incest and sex with children raise legitimate concerns as to
absence of meaningful consent, laws barring these activities are clearly
distinguishable from laws barring consensual same-sex sodomy.4"
It is important not to overstate the claims justified by the foregoing
analysis. In particular, it does not establish any right to engage in sexual
conduct of any kind. Rather, it suggests that if a state wishes to
proscribe certain sexual acts, it may not do so in a way that burdens
only gays and lesbians, at least not without some exceedingly persuasive
justification.4" To conclude otherwise would eviscerate the protection
the Equal Protection Clause provides against substantively oppressive
laws, a protection traceable to the core requirement of equality before
the law.
Legislators seeking to impose different rules on gays and lesbians
than those everyone else has to obey, and hoping to avoid the thrust of
the foregoing analysis, might draw classifications on the basis of sexual
orientation rather than enacting a classification that is explicitly sexbased. Under Romer, however, laws classifying on the basis of sexual
orientation will be scrutinized for "animus" toward gays and lesbians.42
If such laws are based on negative attitudes, fear or irrational prejudice
they will be found to be "rooted in considerations that the Constitution
' Moreover, by focusing on a personality or character
will not tolerate."43
trait rather than on conduct, such laws may run afoul of the constitutional values embodied in the bill of attainder clauses," and because this
trait is so closely bound up with our sense of personal identity,4" such

39. See Amar, supra note 4, at 233.
40. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Society... may prohibit an
individual from imposing his will on another to satisfy his own selfish interests."); id. at 209 n.4
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Mhe nature of familial relationships renders true consent to
incestuous activity sufficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition of such activity is

warranted.").
41. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (holding that any law discriminating
on the basis of sex must have a "exceedingly persuasive justification" to pass constitutional

muster).
42. See Romer, 116 S. CL at 1627, 1628-29. See generally Jackson, supra note 4.
43. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,446-47 (1985); see also
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 62 (arguing that laws "discriminating against homosexuals... [are]
likely to reflect sharp 'we-they' distinctions and irrational hatred and fear").
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10. See generally Amar, supra note 4; Jackson, supra note
4.
45. At least in our culture, sexual orientation is an identity-defining characteristic. See
Terry S. Stein, Overview of New Developments in Understanding Homosexuality, 12 REV.
PSYCHIATRY 9, 20-23 (1993); see also John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich, The Definition
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laws 46are particularly likely to violate the principle of equal citizenship.
In the final analysis, there is no easy solution for legislators seeking
to discriminate against gays and lesbians. Romer poses an obstacle to
classifications based on sexual orientation, and equal protection
principles preclude criminalizing an act based on the sex of the actor.
The foregoing analysis therefore has practical implications for the legal
protection of gays and lesbians, and provides a useful tool in the quest
for gay rights.

and Scope of Sexual Orientation, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 1, 1-2 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991); John C. Gonsiorek &
James D. Rudolph, Homosexual Identity: Coming Out and Other Developmental Events, in
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, 161, 164-65 (1991); Gregory M. Herek, Myths
About Sexual Orientation:A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY
133, 134 & n.2 (1991).
46. As Kenneth Karst has noted, "the essence of any stigma lies in the fact that the
affected individual is not treated as an equal. Inequities that stigmatize 'belie the principle that
people are of equal ultimate worth.' "KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 26, at 25-26.
Because sexual orientation is an identity-defining characteristic, laws imposing disadvantages
based on one's sexual orientation are particularly likely to impugn one's worth as a person. See
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 62 ("[S]ocial antagonism [toward gays is] connected not only with
their acts but also with their identity.").
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